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JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
INVOLVING APPEALS OF INJUNCTIONS
AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS UNDER
28 U.S.C. SECTION 1253, AND THE
PROBLEM OF MOOTNESS
1. INTRODUCTION
In order that the rights of litigants may be speedily determined,
Title 28 of the United States Code, section 12531 was enacted to allow
direct appeals of injunctions issued by a three-judge district court to the
United States Supreme Court. After passage of the Declaratory
Judgment Act 2 litigants began to seek declaratory and injunctive relief
in order to protect their rights. Most of the litigation resulted from the
civil and voting rights cases, where the parties sought both declaratory
and injunctive relief. Appeals of these cases, for the most part, were
taken under section 1253, which deals only with injunctions. This
procedure raised questions as to the possibility of appealing both the
declaratory and injunctive issues together directly to the Supreme
Court.
Not only does the question concerning appeals prove to be
difficult, but there is another compounding factor which enters into
many of these appeals-mootness. Mootness will result in the dismissal
of an appeal because of intervening circumstances which end the need
for litigation. While the appeal is pending, the passage of election day,
death of the parties, or a statutory amendment to a law being
questioned, may render the case moot. The Court, however, has
indicated that mootness may be overridden when policy requirements
are paramount.
The jurisdictional question and problem of mootness was recently
raised in United Citizens Party v. South Carolina State Elections
Commission,3 now on appeal to the United States Supreme Court
under section 1253. This action arose when the United Citizens Party
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
2. Id. § 2201.
3. Order filed October 28, 1970, Federal District Court in Columbia, South
Carolina. Second order filed October 21, 1970, supplementing the first, also giving
declaratory relief.
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sought declaratory and injunctive relief to have their candidates placed
on the November 1970 state election ballot and have section 23-264 of
the South Carolina Code of Laws 4 declared unconstitutional as
violative of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.5 A three-judge district court granted the relief sought,
and the State filed a notice of appeal under section 1253. The appeal
not having been docketed, 6 the Court has been unable to rule on
jurisdiction to hear the case.
The appeal of United Citizens Party raises, first, the jurisdictional
question of whether an appeal under section 1253 will be proper.
Normally section 1253 contemplates only appeals of injunctions,
however, the three-judge district court in this action also ordered a
declaratory judgment. The issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether the
granting of this declaratory judgment will destroy jurisdiction of the
appeal under section 1253. This question has never been considered by
the Supreme Court, and recent Court decisions, to be discussed infra,
have narrowed the scope of appeals under section 1253, raising doubt
as to the validity of appealing these issues together.
Secondly, the matter of mootness on appeals of injunctions is in
question in United Citizens Party because the election day for which
the injunction was ordered has passed. This, in many instances, will
render an appeal moot even if jurisdiction is proper. The impact of the
passage of a day certain and its effect on the issue of mootness along
with the jurisdictional question will be analyzed and discussed in detail
in this article.
I1. APPEALS OF INJUNCTIONS AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
UNDER SECTION 1253
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act7 is used extensively by
parties to have their rights and other legal relations declared by a court.
Often it is used to attack the constitutionality of state laws which
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-264 (1962).
5. Supra note 3.
6. An application for extension of time to docket an appeal was granted for a 60 day
period to end on April 17, 1971.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
19711
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harass or threaten irreparable damage to the party." The act expressly
provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any
court of the United States, upon filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought.9
The elements necessary for declaratory relief are that a "controversy"
must exist of "sufficient immediacy and reality," and the rights must
be determined at the time of the court's hearing rather than at the
commencement of the action.' 0 A declaratory judgment is ordinarily
issued by a single federal district judge," but must be issued by a three-
judge court when the constitutionality of a state law or administrative
order is being questioned or enjoined.' 2 Appeals of declaratory
judgments issued by federal district courts can only be appealed to a
circuit court of appeals, '3 with subsequent appeals going to the
Supreme Court. 4
Injunctions in which the parties allege the unconstitutionality of a
state statute or administrative order can only be issued by a three-judge
federal district court under the Three-Judge Court Act. '1 Appeals under
this act are taken directly to the Supreme Court according to section
1253. This section states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
Problems arise when a three-judge district court issues both
injunctive and declaratory relief. If the decision is appealed, the circuit
courts apparently do not have jurisdiction to hear the matter, 7 and
8. Samuels v. Mackell, 91 S.Ct. 764 (1971).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
10. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
il. 28 U.S.C. § 2101 by implication.
12. Id. §§ 2281-2284.
13. Id. § 1291.
14. Id. § 1254.
15. Id. §§ 2281-2284.
16. Id. § 1253.
17. Appeals under section 1253 apparently are mandatory and review by the circuit
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is improper.
[Vol. 23
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section 1253 is the only avenue of appeal offered directly to the
Supreme Court. Whether the Supreme Court can hear an appeal of
both the declaratory judgment and the injunction under section 1253, in
effect allowing both together in a package is an open question. This
"piggyback" issue has never been ruled on directly by the Court, but it
has been allowed at least by implication.'5 Although declaratory
judgments and injunctions have both been afforded this speedy appeal
treatment, there is some indication that the scope of appeal under
section 1253 is being narrowed and the practice of. appealing both
forms of relief directly could cease.
The affirmative implication that section 1253 is the avenue for
appeals of both injunctions and declaratory judgments issued
simultaneously came in two cases arising out of the same litigation. In
Zwickler v. Kooa,9 and Golden v. Zwickler,20 the plaintiff sought
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the New York State
Election Law, seeking to have this law declared unconstitutional. In
Zwickler v. Koota, the Supreme Court remanded the case to a three-
judge district court where the plaintiff, Zwickler, was granted
declaratory relief. This district court decision was appealed under
section 1253 in Golden v. Zwickler, where the Supreme Court reversed
the lower court, holding that Zwickler had not properly alleged the
elements of a declaratory judgment.
21
The real question, that of jurisdiction, was apparently overlooked
by the Court in Golden v. Zwickler. The Court, without questioning the
section 1253 jurisdiction,22 based its entire opinion on the validity of the
declaratory judgment, although the Court had earlier remanded the
18. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969).
19. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
20. 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
21. Id. at 110.
22. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant in Koota at 1. This question was
discussed in a telephone interview February 3, 1971, with Louis J. Lefkowitz, First
Assistant Attorney General of New York, in New York City, who argued both Golden
and Koota in the Supreme Court. He said that jurisdiction was granted under section
1253. His conversation was verified in a letter from Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney
General of New York to Michael W. Tighe, Assistant Attorney General of South
Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, February 16, 1971, on file in the South Carolina
Attorney General's Office. This letter indicated that because both injunctive and
declaratory relief were requested and granted, this case was properly appealed under
section 1253. From this information it could be said that if the injunction had not been at
issue, jurisdiction would not have been granted under section 1253.
1971]
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declaratory judgment for consideration in Koota.2 It does not appear
that the injunction was at issue, thus, the Court should have dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction. It seems wrong that the initial case,
Koota, was appealed properly under section 1253 if the "piggyback"
rule is proper. In any event, it was remanded by the Supreme Court for
a determination on the declaratory relief question.24 On the subsequent
appeal in Golden, section 1253 was again the avenue used for
jurisdictional purposes," and no issue was raised as to it. Even applying
the "piggyback" rule to Golden, jurisdiction under section 1253
appears improper.
Apparent justification for allowing the first, Koota, to be appealed
under section 1253, and for the Court to properly consider the
injunction and the declaratory judgment as a "package" can be found
in the recent case, Perez v. Ledesma.21 In Perez, the Court found that a
three-judge district court did not have jurisdiction to declare a local
ordinance, not of statewide application, unconstitutional. Also, the
declaratory judgment had been separately rendered by a single district
judge not by a three-judge court. The injunction was issued by a three-
judge court but it made no mention of the declaratory relief issued by
the single district judge. This had the effect of taking the declaratory
issues out of the direct appeal under section 1253, and "[t]he fact that
the clerk of the District Court merged these orders into one judgment
does not confer jurisdiction upon this court." z Here there was no
significantly close relationship between the injunction granted and the
declaratory relief ordered to invoke jurisdiction under section 1253.
Further support for the proposition that injunction and declaratory
judgment must be significantly close in relationship, both as to issues of
fact and law, can be found in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
Perez:
This is not a case in which the District Court's action on the
prayer for declaratory relief was so bound up with its action on the
request for an injunction that this Court might, on direct appeal,
consider the propriety of declaratory relief on pendancy grounds.2
23. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
24. 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
25. Supra note 19.
26. 91 S.Ct. 674 (1971).
27. Id. at 678.
28. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 23
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He cited Zwickler v. Koota as being sufficiently analogous to this
principle in order to support his conclusion. This indicates that where
both declaratory and injunctive relief are requested a three-judge
district court may render a decision on both, and if they are
significantly related with each other in fact and law, they should be the
proper subject of an appeal under section 1253.
From the implications in Koota, Golden, and Perez, the Court
apparently is of the opinion that where an injunction and declaratory
judgment are granted, both may properly be appealed under section
1253. This operation of the "piggyback" appeal of both types of relief
would only be proper where they are significantly close in relationship,
or very closely bound up in fact and law. According to this analysis
Koota was correctly before the Court, where as, Golden, the latter
decision, was not. This is true because Golden dealt only with the
declaratory issues and not with the injunction, thereby divesting itself
of the jurisdiction offered by section 1253.
From 1967 to 1969, the Court apparently was not concerned with
direct appeals in accord with section 1253, as evidenced by Koota, and
Golden. Since this decision, however, the Court has become more
concerned with appeals of injunctive and declaratory decisions of three-
judge courts under section 1253, and has limited the scope of appeal in
this area.
11I. CASES NARROWING THE SCOPE OF APPEAL UNDER SECTION 1253
Appeals under section 1253 are narrowed in scope by the Court
finding that no injunction is in issue. This was the case in Goldstein v.
Cox,29 where the appellants, Romanian aliens, sought their share of a
New York decedant's estate. However, they were barred from doing so
by a New York statute which prohibited payment to them, citizens of a
communist nation, because it appeared that the appellants "would not
have the benefit or use or control of the money or property" 30
constituting their share of the estate. The appellants challenged this
statute on constitutional grounds and prayed for both temporary and
injunctive relief against the operation of the statute. This relief was
denied by a single judge district court. Appeal was taken, and a three-
29. 396 U.S. 471 (1970).
30. New York Surrogate's Court Procedure Act § 2218.
1971]
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judge court was appointed. 3' The appellants then made a motion for
summary judgment which was denied.3 The appeal was taken under
section 1253, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.-
Upon hearing, the Court concluded they lacked jurisdiction of the
appeal under section 1253.m The Court was faced with the question of
"whether the District Court's order denying summary judgment to a
plaintiff who has requested injunctive relief is an order . . . denying
. . .an .. . injunction within the meaning of section 1253."13 In
answering this question, the Court took a narrow view of section 1253
and concluded, "'that the only interlocutory orders which we have
power to review under that provision are orders granting or denying
preliminary injunctions. ' 3 The Court based this decision on a review
of the Three Judge Court Act, 37 concluding that review of a three-judge
court action is limited "to (1) final judgments granting or denying
permanent injunctions and (2) interlocutory orders granting or denying
preliminary injunctions. '"
This decision was in keeping with the policy of narrow
construction being given to the Three Judge Court Act to keep within
the limits of appellate review.3 9 This also upholds the long term policy
of Congress in avoiding piecemeal appellate review." This narrow
construction of section 1253 limits its application to orders granting or
denying a preliminary injunction, and as here, where such relief is not
prayed for, there is no jurisdictional basis in section 1253.
The appellants were unable to use section 1253 because they did
not take a practical step in obtaining the injunctive relief, nor did they
file a separate application for preliminary injunction or urge the
appropriateness of this relief. Therefore, the Court had no choice but to
find that the order of the district court was interlocutory and not an
"order granting or denying a preliminary injunction ..
31. 391 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. 299 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
33. 394 U.S. 996 (1969).
34. Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471 (1970).
35. Id. at 475.
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84.
38. 396 U.S. 477 (1970).
39. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941).
40. 396 U.S. 471 (1970).
41. Id. at 479.
[Vol. 23
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This was the first step taken by the Court in whittling down the
scope of appellate review under section 1253. Here, a summary
judgment was not the proper action which offered appeal within the
purview of section 1253, nor was the motion for "the relief prayed for
in the complaint" sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction offered by this
section. This indicates that the party seeking relief must pray for an
injunction and follow this action up, and specifically obtain, or be
denied injunctive relief by the lower court before a section 1253 appeal
is warranted.
Six months later, Goldstein was followed by Mitchell v.
Donovan,42 where the appellants sought declaratory relief, a temporary
restraining order, and a permanent injunction. This action was
instituted to have the Minnesota Secretary of State place certain
Communist Party candidates on the 1968 Presidential Election ballot.
The three-judge district court allowed the injunction and the names
were placed on the ballot, but found the requirement for a declaratory
judgment of a "case of actual controversy" missing and dismissed the
complaint.43 Appeal was taken under section 1253. The Court found
that no jurisdiction existed because "[t]he order appealed from does no
more than deny the appellants a declaratory judgment striking down
the Communist Control Act."44 The injunction requested had been
granted, thus removing the case from the purview of appellate review
offered by section 1253. The Court was only faced with the question of
whether a declaratory judgment may be appealed under section 1253,
and based on the recent case, Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center,,-
the answer was no. Rockefeller was a brief per curiam decision which
held that a declaratory judgment could not be appealed directly to the
Supreme Court under section 1253. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Mitchell, felt that a "declaratory judgment may well contain 'thou
shall not' language which is] as commanding as any injunction."4 He
was saying that because a declaratory judgment has in some cases the
same force and effect as an injunction, it should be accorded the same
treatment as an injunction under section 1253.
42. 90 S.Ct. 1763 (1970).
43. 300 F. Supp. 1145 (D.C. Minn. 1969).
44. 90 S.Ct. 1763 (1970).
45. 397 U.S. 820 (1970).
46. 90 S.Ct. 1763, 1764, 1765 (1970).
1971]
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Another case which considered appeals under section 1253 was
Gunn v. University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam,4" where
the Court again took the opportunity to limit review under section
1253. The appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
prohibit and enjoin the enforcement of a Texas statute, relief to which
the district court found the appellants entitled in a short per curiam
opinion.48 Appeal under section 1253 was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction by the Court because "there was no order of any kind
either granting or denying an injunction-interlocutory or
permanent."49 The order of the three-judge district court which stated
the appellants were entitled to an injunction was not followed by one
granting the relief requested. Hence, no injunction was ever issued
which could serve as a basis for jurisdiction in accord with section
1253. A mere order saying the appellants were "entitled" to relief is not
sufficient to categorize the order as one granting an injunction
contemplated in section 1253. The Court pointed out that Rule 65(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires injunctions to be
"specific in terms" and be "in reasonable detail."'' Therefore, the
47. 90 S.Ct. 2013 (1970).
48. 289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Texas 1969). The Supreme Court found this opinion
faulty because the injunctive relief granted was uncertain as to against whom it was to
run, and what the opinion really said. It did not have the effect of an injunction, nor in the
months following the order was any injunction issued by the lower court. The final
paragraph of the order as cited by the Court said:
We reach the conclusion that Article 474 is impermissibly and
unconstitutionally broad. The Plaintiffs herein are entitled to their
declaratory judgment to that effect, and to injunctive relief against the
enforcement of Article 474 as now worded, insofar as it may affect rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment. However, it is the Order of this
Court that the mandate shall be stayed and this Court shall retain
jurisdiction of the cause pending the next session, special or general, of the
Texas legislature, at which time the State of Texas may, if it so desires,
enact such disturbing-the-peace statute as will meet constitutional
requirements. (Emphasis added by the Court)
49. 90 S.Ct. 2013 (1970).
50. Id. at 2016. Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order. Every order
granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon
the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with
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Court held that jurisdiction did not exist because an injunction had not
been ordered as required by section 1253.
The problem of appeals under section 1253 has been narrowed and
clouded by a series of recent decisions involving injunctions and
declaratory judgments which limit their applicability before three-
judge courts." To a great degree, most deal with what are proper
injunctions and declaratory judgments to be brought before a three-
judge court, although one case does deal with appeals under section
1253. However, they should be briefly reviewed because if a matter is
improperly brought to, and decided by a three-judge court, the
resulting appeal would be without jurisdiction granted by section 1253.
In Younger v. Harris,52 the appellant sought to enjoin an
impending state criminal prosecution and get declaratory relief. The
Court expressly disclaimed any attempt to "decide whether the word
'injunction' in section 1253 should be interpreted to include a
declaratory judgment. . . ... " The Court went on to hold that persons
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2282 set forth those types of relief which may be granted
only by a three judge court. There are some other areas in which the Code calls for the
impaneling of a three-judge court. All of these areas are enumerated in 7 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.16 (1969):
Actions Required to Be Heard and Determined by a Three-Judge District
Court.
In summary, a specially constituted district court of three judges is
required in the following cases:
1. In a civil (equity) action brought by the United States under the
anti-trust and related statutes if the Attorney General files a certificate of
public importance.
2. In a civil action wherein either an interlocutory or permanent
injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement:
of a state statute or administrative order upon the ground that the
statute or order is contrary to the federal Constitution and this federal
claim is substantial;
of an Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the
United States;
of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission "other than for
the payment of money or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures";
and
of an order of certain other federal administrative boards and
agencies, where the method for judicial review of I.C.C. orders has been
adopted.
52. 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971).
53. Id. at 748. To have equated "injunction" and "declaratory judgment" would
have the effect of bringing both actions with appeals under section 1253. This would
overrule the holdings in Mitchell v. Donovan, 90 S.Ct. 1763 (1970); and Rockefeller v.
Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820 (1970).
19711 NoTs
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seeking injunctive relief in federal courts will no longer be afforded it
where they want to enjoin a state prosecution because it chills the
exercise of their First Amendment rights, unless they are being
prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the statute. An
additional requirement with regard to these injunctions was added in
Samuels v. Mackell, 4 where the Court held that to get an injunction,
the party must show that they "would suffer immediate and irreparable
damages."
The most recent case construing the applicability of section 1253
was Perez v. Ledesma,15 where the appellant sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, which was granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the:
[T]hree-judge court was not properly convened to consider the
constitutionality of a statute of only local application, similar to a
local ordinance. Under 28 U.S.C. section 1253 we have
jurisdiction to consider on direct appeal only those civil actions
"required to be heard and determined" by a three-judge court."
Here, because the constitutionality of the ordinance was not "required
to be heard and determined" by a three-judge court, no jurisdiction
under section 1253 lies.
57
IV. PRESENT STATUS OF SECTION 1253 APPEALS
It is difficult to state definite rules for determining when an appeal
is properly brought directly to the Supreme Court. To blend this
patchwork of a few cases into a single thread which will tie these results
together is difficult, and future cases will have to develop this area and
fill the gaps of doubt left by the decisions. An analysis of the case on
appeal to the Supreme Court under section 1253, United Citizens Party
v. The South Carolina State Election Commission," might offer some
insight as to the method by which the Court will dispose of these cases
in the future.
In United Citizens Party, the appellants sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to have the names of their candidates placed on the
54. 91 S.Ct. 764 (1971).
55. 91 S. Ct. 674 (1971).
56. Id. at 677.
57. See Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), which held a three-judge court could
not be impaneled to consider the constitutionality of a statute of only local application.
58. Supra note 3.
[Vol. 23
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November, 1970 South Carolina General Election ballot. The district
court gave the relief requested, and declared the statute unconstitu-
tional. 9 The state then filed notice of appeal under section 1253
directly to the Supreme Court. If jurisdiction is obtained under section
1253, it will be a prime example of the "piggyback" or pendant rule in
operation. As in Zwickler v. Koota, ° the lower court had issued an
order granting the relief requested. The United Citizens Party action
was a proper case to be considered by a three-judge court under the
Three Judge Court Act,6 and it does not run afoul of the cases where
specific orders were issued yet failed to grant an injunction on which a
section 1253 appeal can be based as in Gunn v. The University
Committee to End the War in Viet Nam." There is no doubt as to the
fact that the injunction was issued or its effect. Here, both issues are
being appealed and the Court will have to deal with them. No question,
as implied, in Golden v. Zwickler,6 concerning the propriety of an
appeal dealing only with a declaratory judgment and not the injunction
will be considered; in United Citizens Party, both the injunctive and
declaratory relief are at issue. Therefore, even in view of the narrow
construction given section 1253, United Citizens Party should be a
proper case for direct appeal because the injunction provides the basis
here, and there is no doubt as to it being issued. The declaratory
judgment should ride "piggyback" with the injunction under section
1253 and both matters ruled on by the Court. The questions of the
injunction and the declaratory judgment are both before the Court and
are so bound up in fact and law that they are pendant issues, only to be
properly decided together. The injunction leaves no doubt as to the
specificity requirement along with the fact that it was an order filed by
the three-judge court. Section 1253 is the proper appeal route for
United Citizens Party.
V. THE PROBLEMS OF MOOTNESS ON APPEAL
Once appeals of injunctions are within the jurisdiction of the
Court, there is the ever present problem of mootness. As a general rule,
the purpose to be served by an injunction ceases to exist when the
59. Supra note 3.
60. Supra note 15.
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2284.
62. Supra note 43.
63. Supra note 7.
1971]
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"issue becomes moot and hence no longer justiciable [and because of]
...intervening circumstances there are no longer adverse parties with
sufficient legal interest to maintain the litigation." 64 There are many
ways in which an injunction issue may become moot and these will be
discussed with emphasis on the United Citizens Party litigation, as well
as methods by which the mootness may be overridden in proper cases.
United Citizens Party, now on appeal, faces the problem of
mootness because one of the purposes of the injunction was to have the
names of the party's candidates placed on the November, 1970, ballot.
Now that election day has passed, should the appeal be dismissed
because the issue has become moot? The rule that the passage of
election day will result in dismissal of an appeal because the purpose for
which the injunction was to serve has ceased to exist is not without
exception. There are circumstances, as indicated by several cases," 5
which may override the mootness caused by the passage of a day
certain. These factors go beyond the test of looking at a particular day
in question, and review the policy aspects such as cutting down on
multiplicity of litigation.
Similar to the United Citizens Party case, the problem of
mootness was considered in Moore v. Ogilvie," where the parties
sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute. The statute required a number of
names on a petition for candidates running for political office on an
independent ticket. The appellees urged that the appeal should be
dismissed because the election had already been held, and that there
was no possibility of granting any relief to the appellants. An earlier
decision, MacDougal v. Green," refused to enjoin this same statute as
unconstitutional, and the Court here overrruled MacDougal." The
Court found this to be important in relation to mootness urged by the
appellees, because here the passage of election day did not render the
case moot.
[T]he burden which MacDougal v. Green, . . .allowed to be
placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices
64. 6A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 3074 (1969).
65. These circumstances can be policy considerations, or the matter is capable of
repetition or evades review. The cases following fully develop this concept.
66. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
67. 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
68. 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969).
(Vol. 23
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remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains
her present system as she has done since 1935. The problem is
therefore capable of repetition, yet evading review. The need for
resolution reflects a continuing controversy in the federal-state
area where our one man, one vote decisions have thrust. 69
Mootness was overshadowed by these important considerations
which were capable of repetition and the presence of a continuing
controversy. This is analagous to United Citizens Party in that the
state statute set the times within which the parties must nominate their
candidates, and the appellees did not comply with this requirement. The
three-judge District Court7" held this to be unconstitutional, and
enjoined the state from enforcing it. This problem is continuing in
nature, and capable of repetition because this same statute apparently
remains in full force and effect placing a continuing burden on the state
to enforce it as in Moore v. Ogilvie. It was apparently only to be
disregarded for this particular election .7 This same problem remains
and controls future elections. Under the rule of Moore v. Ogilvie, the
passage of election day should not render the United Citizens Party
appeal moot because of the element of continuing controversy.
In Golden v. Zwickler,72 mootness was also a consideration. The
Court found mootness overridden even though the subject of
Zwickler's handbills, a candidate for Congress, had since become a
judge and election day had passed. The Court said:
When this action was initiated the controversy was genuine,
substantial and immediate, even though the date to which the
literature was pertinent had already passed. The fortuitous
circumstance that the candidate in relation to whose bid for office
the anomyous handbill was circulated had, while vindication
inched tediously forward, removed himself from the role of target
of the 1964 handbill does not moot the plaintiffs further and far
broader right to a general adjudication of unconstitutionality his
complaint prays for. . ..
This indicates that as in United Citizens Party, the parties have a
genuine, substantial and immediate right to a determination of the
69. Id. at 816.
70. Supra note 3.
71. Interview with Michael W. Tighe, Assistant Attorney General of South
Carolina, February 4, 1970, in Columbia, South Carolina; supra note 3.
72. 394 U.S. 103 1969.
73. Id. at 107.
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constitutionality of the state statute which should remove the bar of
mootness.
The Court suggested another way in which mootness could be
overridden in Brockington v. Rhodes," although this was not the result.
The appellant attacked an Ohio statute which required candidates of
independent parties to submit petitions containing names of 7% of the
registered voters in that state before the candidate could be placed on
the ballot. The lower court denied relief, and since that time the election
day had passed, and the legislature amended the law changing the
requirement from 7% to 4%.
The statutory amendment did not render the case moot because
the appellee had only 1% of the voters on his petition,75 however, the
passage of election day did moot the case. The Court set out various
factors influencing this decision, which could be used as guidelines for
review in other cases involving mootness. They said:
[1]n view of the limited nature of the relief sought, we think the
case is moot because the congressional election is over. The
appellant did not allege that he intended to run for office in any
future elections. He did not attempt to maintain a class action on
behalf of himself and other putative independent candidates,
present or future. He did not sue for himself and others similarly
situated as independent voters, as he might have under Ohio law.
He did not seek a declaratory judgment, although that avenue was
open to him. 8
Using these factors, the Court said the passage of election day
mooted the issues and the appeal was dismissed. Applying these
standards to the United Citizens Party, the appellees sought broad
injunctive and declaratory relief suggested by the Court as necessary.
The party did not specifically allege they intended to run for offices in
future elections, but this requirement would be satisfied in that there is
a strong implication that they would because the party was formed to
run candidates in future elections. This implication has proved to be
correct.77 The Party did bring the action as a class and not for one
74. 396 U.S.41 (1969).
75. Id. at 43.
76. Id.
77. The United Citizens Party continues as a political party registered in South
Carolina and active in political matters. Currently Mrs. Victoria DeLee is the party's
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particular candidate, as was the case in Brockington. Because the
criteria suggested by the Court could be complied with in the United
Citizens Party action, there is a strong argument for overriding the
mootness resulting from the passage of election day.
Even with the passage of election day raising the problem of
mootness, there are other types of areas which can raise the mootness
aspect even if the day certain mootness can be circumvented. As
suggested in Brockington, and as was the case in Hall v. Beals,78
intervening statutory amendment of the law being questioned can
render a case moot. In Hall, the appellants questioned the Colorado
residency requirement imposed in order to be eligible to vote. Their
petition was denied in the lower court,79 and during the time of the
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Colorado Legislature reduced the
residency requirement from six months to two months. The Court held
that:
[I]he 1968 election is history, and it is impossible to grant the
appellants the relief they sought. . . Further, the appellants have
now satisfied the six month residency requirement of which they
complained. But apart from these considerations, the recent
amendatory action of the Colorado Legislature has surely
operated to render this case moot.80
The amending act of the legislature did not render the matter moot in
Brockington because the amendment did not affect the appellant's
contention that 1% was sufficient. He still was below the 4%
requirement imposed by the statute as amended.
There has been no statutory amendment with regard to the
objections raised in United Citizens Party; however, if the South
Carolina Legislature amended section 23-264 of the South Carolina
Code of Laws"' remedying the alleged wrong before the appeal was
argued, it would render the case moot. There has been some speculation
that this could be the result 2 in this case.
78. 90 S.Ct. 200 (1969).
79. 292 F. Supp. 610 (D.C. Colo. 1969).
80. Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200 (1969).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-264 (1962).
82. Interview with Michael W. Tighe, Assistant Attorney General of South
Carolina, February 4, 1971. Mr. Tighe indicated that the Legislature is considering
amending section 23-264 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, and this would render the
case moot. Supra note 68. Also contemplated is enacting a new statute which would not
amend section 23-264, but provide for other procedures to correct the alleged wrong.
1971]
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These new rules governing mootness of injunctions on appeal
cover most of the issues that will be raised in future cases. There are
other less important rules which if applied will render a case moot.
Circumstances such as the death of a party in the action, failure to
replace them with a proper party,m or failing to allege injunctive relief
infuturo,5 can all result in mootness.
There is another argument for making distinction between
mootness because of the passage of election day on appeals of
injunctions, and declaratory judgments. There is a stronger argument
for overriding mootness in declaratory judgments when a day certain
has passed than when this question is involved in an injunction. The
nature of the relief sought is the basis of the distinction in that an
injunction contemplates the happening of one particular event, where as
declaratory relief goes much further in determining the rights of the
parties. Generally, the Court has not made this distinction with regard
to mootness questions."8 Further, if the rules as suggested concerning
appeals hold true, proper appeals under section 1253 will allow both
types of relief to be appealed as a package and all rules governing
mootness in both types of relief sought should apply equally.
Vl. CONCLUSION
The scope of appeals from three-judge district courts under section
1253 is now being more narrowly construed. As the cases now indicate,
only orders of a three-judge district court granting or denying an
injunction are proper cases for direct appeal. Any decision which does
not expressly order an injunction will not suffice, nor will any order
which states the parties are "entitled" to injunctive relief. United
Citizens Party will offer the Court an opportunity to decide the further
question of whether or not a declaratory judgment issued with the
injunction can be appealed directly along with the injunction issue
under section 1253. Under the present rules it should be allowed as a
pendant issue because it is sufficiently related to the prayer for
injunctive relief. As a practical matter it would be very easy to amend
83. Pullman Co. v. Croon, 231 U.S. 571 (1913).
84. Richardson v. McChesney, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
85. Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Wagner, 298 F.2d 552
(1962).
86. The relief sought in Hall v. Beals, and Brockington v. Rhodes was an injunction
and both indicated the mootness could be overridden.
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sections 1253 and 1284 and provide that when three-judge courts are
convened to hear an injunction they may also, when requested, issue a
declaratory judgment, and that on direct appeal this declaratory
judgment will also be an issue to be decided under a section 1253
appeal.
In many of these cases mootness intervenes before the appeal is
perfected, and could well do so in United Citizens Party because the
election day has passed. However, due to the overriding policy
considerations and other rules suggested in the cases, the possible
mootness could be circumvented, and the case heard by the Court.
WILLIAM E. JENKINSON, III
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